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Abstract—Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a prominent
cryptographic tool for secure data sharing in the cloud because
it can be used to enforce very expressive and fine-grained access
control on outsourced data. The revocation in ABE remains
a challenging problem as most of the revocation techniques
available today, suffer from the collusion attack. The revocable
ABE schemes which are collusion resistant require the aid of
a semi-trusted manager to achieve revocation. More specifically,
the semi-trusted manager needs to update the secret keys of
nonrevoked users followed by a revocation. This introduces
computation and communication overhead, and also increases
the overall security vulnerability. In this work, we propose a
revocable ABE scheme that is collusion resistant and does not
require any semi-trusted entity. In our scheme, the secret keys of
the nonrevoked users are never affected. Our decryption requires
only an additional pairing operation compared to the baseline
ABE scheme. We are able to achieve these at the cost of a little
increase (compared to the baseline scheme) in the size of the
secret key and the ciphertext. Theoretical performance analysis
and experimental results show that our scheme outperforms the
relatable existing schemes.
Index Terms—secure cloud data sharing, attribute based encryption, revocation

I. I NTRODUCTION
Many companies and organizations often outsource their
data to a public cloud to enjoy advantages such as availability,
scalability, and lower maintenance cost offered by the cloud.
However, confidentiality and access control of the outsourced
data remains a concern since the data owner loses control over
the data once it is uploaded to the cloud. Recently, attributebased encryption (ABE) has become a very promising tool [1]
to achieve confidentiality and fine-grained access control for
data outsourcing in the cloud. ABE allows a data owner to
encrypt his or her data using a policy expressed in terms of a
set of attributes so that it can be decrypted only if the secret
key has enough attributes to satisfy the policy. Let us consider
the motivational example in the following section.
A. A motivational example
Suppose CryptoFlix is a Netflix-like streaming service that
keeps all its media contents in a public cloud run by a thirdparty cloud service provider. Before outsourcing media files
to the public cloud, it encrypts them using attribute-based
encryption scheme. CryptoFlix offers two types of subscription
plans: basic and premium. Basic and premium plans allow a
subscriber to choose three and five attributes, respectively. Let
us assume that two users, Alice and Bob, have a subscription
This research is partially supported by a NSF grant 1449344.

for the basic plan, and another user, Eve has a subscription
for the premium plan. Alice loves science fiction movies
and documentaries, she gets decryption keys for attributes
movie, scifi, and documentary from the attribute authority
(a trusted entity responsible for generating and distributing
attribute secret keys). Conversely, Bob loves newly released
tv shows and gets decryption keys for new release, tv show,
and documentary attributes from attribute authority. Let Eve
has decryption keys for attribute movie, tv show, documentary,
scifi, and new release, but her premium subscription plan recently expired. CryptoFlix encrypts the newly released science
fiction movie XFiction under the policy (new release AND
movie AND scifi) and uploads it to a public cloud. Note that
none of the three users can decrypt XFiction under normal
circumstance. However, they can cooperate with each other
and try to decrypt it by launching the following attacks:
• Type I attack: Multiple users who individually do not
have enough attributes to satisfy a policy cooperate with
each other so that their collective attribute keys may
satisfy the policy.
• Type II attack: A revoked user who cannot decrypt a
file despite having enough attributes to satisfy the policy
cooperates with a nonrevoked user to restore his or her
decryption ability in order to decrypt the file.
These attacks are called collusion attack. In a type I attack,
Alice and Bob would combine their attribute keys and try
to decrypt XFiction. On the otherhand, in a type II attack,
Eve would combine her attribute keys with a nonrevoked user
(such as Bob) and try to decrypt XFiction. Not to mention
CryptoFlix faces financial loss if any of the attacks becomes
successful. This motivational example will be referred to
repeatedly in the upcoming sections.
B. Limitations of the existing schemes and our novelty
Collusion resistance is a fundamental security requirement
of any ABE scheme, as stated in the original ABE scheme
proposed by Sahai et al. [2]. Initially proposed ABE schemes
such as [1]–[3] do not support revocation. If CryptoFlix were
to use such an ABE scheme, it could not revoke Eve even
if her subscription expired. As a result, such schemes are
not suitable for a practical application like secure cloud data
sharing. They are resistant to type I collusion attacks. However,
type II collusion attacks do not apply to them as those schemes
do not support revocation. The revocation is a challenging
problem in ABE since the same attribute may be shared among
different users. Hur et al. proposed a solution to the revocation

problem in [4], [5]. The proposed solution is based on the idea
of attribute group. The user’s secret key consists of two parts.
One is associated with the user’s attributes, and the other is
associated with the attribute group. They are called decryption
secret key (DSK) and key encryption key (KEK), respectively.
The revocation is dictated by KEK and is independent of the
user’s DSK. Consequently, the KEK of one user works with
the DSK of another user. Hence, the proposed revocable ABE
scheme is not resistant against type II collusion attacks as a
revoked user by colluding with a nonrevoked user can get
the valid KEK and restore his or her decryption ability. This
vulnerability was first pointed out by Li et al. [6]. Schemes
such as [7], [8] also have the same vulnerability since these
solutions are also based on the same idea. Li et al. refined their
initial solution [6] in [9]. To revoke a user from the attribute
group, the attribute manager (AM) updates the existing user’s
KEK keys. They bind a user’s DSK with his or her KEK so
that the KEK of one user does not work with the DSK of
another user. This ensures that a revoked user cannot collude
with a nonrevoked user to restore his or her decryption right.
However, this scheme has the following limitations:
• Each time a user is revoked, all nonrevoked users’ keys
(KEK) are affected because DSK and KEK keys are tied
together by a common secret exponent that is only known
to a semi-trusted party called the attribute manager (AM).
This exponent is common across attribute secret keys of
all the users. To revoke a user, this exponent needs to be
updated in the secret keys for all nonrevoked users.
• It requires the additional semi-trusted AM for updating
all nonrevoked users’ secret keys (KEK) and distributing
them to the respective users. This not only adds a lot of
overhead, but also increases the security vulnerability by
adding an additional semi-trusted party to the system.
• AM also becomes the performance bottleneck as it needs
to participate in the key generation, key update, encryption, and re-encryption stages. Key generation is an onetime operation. However, other operations occur very
frequently, which can be a huge burden for a centralized
entity like AM to handle.
By following the footstep of [9], CryptCloud+ [10] also
proposes a collusion-resistant revocable ABE scheme. In this
scheme, the attribute authority has to periodically update the
attribute secret keys of all the users according to a revocation
list, which is very inefficient. Clearly, recent research leaves
significant gaps. Our proposed revocable ABE scheme fills
these research gaps for the first time. Like Li et al.’s schemes
( [6] and [9]), our revocable ABE scheme is also collusion
resistant against both type I and type II attacks. However, in
our scheme, revocation does not affect the secret key of any
nonrevoked user. Moreover, our scheme does not need the aid
of any additional trusted entity, which minimizes the attack
surface. This is made possible since we achieve revocation
by modifying the core ABE secret key and ciphertext elements rather than achieving revocation by attribute group keys
(KEK). We discuss our technique in the following section.
C. Our technique and contribution
Our revocation technique can be applied to any ABE scheme
that does not support revocation (e.g., [1], [3], [11]). However,
in this paper we choose the scheme proposed in [1] for

several reasons. This scheme has a large universe construction
(meaning that any arbitrary string can be used as an attribute)
and it has been proven to be selectively secure in standard
model (as opposed to the artificial random oracle model)
under decisional q-Parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent
(decisional q-BDHE) assumption. These properties are more
desirable in real-life application from both functional and
security standpoints. Our ABE scheme also inherits these
properties. We achieve revocation by modifying the core ABE
secret key and ciphertext components and distributing them
according to a binary tree. A data owner can revoke any user
while encrypting a message using the minimum cover algorithm (Sec. III-F) on the binary tree. This required us to design
new setup, encryption, keygen, and decryption algorithms for
our proposed revocable ABE scheme. We briefly summarize
our contribution as follows:
• We propose a collusion-resistant revocable ABE scheme
that is resistant against both type I and type II collusion attacks. We achieve revocation property through
modification of the core ABE secret key and ciphertext
components. Hence, we eliminate the requirement of any
semi-trusted entity for key updating.
• Revocation in our scheme never affects the secret keys of
any nonrevoked user. A data owner can revoke any user’s
decryption ability from a particular file by including
him/her in the revocation list during encryption.
• To show the effectiveness of our proposed collusionresistant revocable ABE scheme, we build a secure cloud
data sharing scheme based on it.
• Through proper security analysis, we prove that our
scheme is collusion resistant.
• Through extensive theoretical and experimental performance analysis, we show that our scheme outperforms
recently proposed similar schemes.
II. R ELATED WORKS
Revocable ABE was first addressed by Sahai et al. in [12],
and then realized by Qin et al. in [13]. The attributes in both
user’s secret key and the access structure of a ciphertext are
associated with different expiration time. The time specifies
how long a secret key is allowed to decrypt a ciphertext.
The cloud has to periodically update the access structure of
a ciphertext using proxy re-encryption to enforce revocation.
However, the problem is that, a colluding cloud can re-encrypt
a ciphertext to an expiration time so that it can be decrypted by
a user’s expired secret key. The scheme proposed in [14] also
incorporates the same idea of achieving revocation by updating
the ciphertext. Instead of updating the ciphertext in a timely
fashion, an aide server updates the ciphertext according to the
data owner’s provided revocation list. However, this scheme
also suffers from a similar kind of collusion attack (serverrevoked user) as [13]. Recently, [15] improved the security of
[14] by replacing the single server with a dual server.
Hur et al. followed a different approach for revocation of
ABE in [4] and later improved its security in [5]. According
to their proposed solution, a user belongs to various attribute
groups and the authorized set of attributes is determined by
the attribute groups the user belongs to. A user’s secret key
consists of two parts: decryption secret key (DSK) and key
encryption key (KEK), respectively. The DSK is associated

TABLE I: Comparison with related schemes in terms of security and functionality.
Scheme
Hur-I [4]
Hur-II [5]
CryptCloud+ [10]
Flexible [6]
UserCol [9]
Ours

Security assumption
Generic Group
Generic Group
l-SDH
Generic Group
Generic Group
decisional q-BDHE

Security Model
RO
RO
Standard
RO
RO
Standard

with the user’s attributes, while the KEK is associated with the
user’s attribute groups. Revocation is achieved by encrypting
certain ciphertext components with KEK keys so that a user
cannot decrypt the ciphertext without the appropriate KEK
key despite having enough attributes in the DSK key. Li et
al. first pointed out in [6] that DSK and KEK keys in Hur
et al.’s proposed solution are independent of each other. As
a result, a revoked user can collude with a nonrevoked user,
and combine the nonrevoked user’s KEK key with his or her
own DSK keys to restore the decryption ability. Schemes like
[7], [8] also suffer from the same revoked-nonrevoked user
collusion attack. Li et al. proposed an initial solution to solve
this collusion problem in [6], [16] and later improved the
security in [9]. The revoked and nonrevoked user collusion
problem was solved by binding the DSK key with the KEK key
so that one user’s DSK key does not work with another user’s
KEK key. The limitation of the proposed scheme was that a
semi-trusted attribute manager has to update all nonrevoked
users’ KEK keys for revocation, which not only adds a lot
of overhead, but also adds additional security vulnerability
as the attribute manager can collude with revoked users to
restroe their decryption ability. The attribute manager also
needs to process every ciphertext, which can be a performance
bottleneck. The solution proposed in CryptCloud+ [10] also
relies on a semi-trusted entity for key update in revocation.
In Table I, we compare our scheme with the most relatable
ones in terms of security and functionalities. Our scheme is
selectively secure in the standard model under the decisional
q-Parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (decisional qBDHE) assumption [1]. CryptCloud+ is proven to be secure in
the standard model based on the hardness of l-Strong DiffieHellman (l-SDH) assumption. Hur-I [4], Hur-II [5], Flexible
[6], and UserCol [9] are secure in the random oracle (RO)
model with generic group assumption. According to [1] the
random oracle model is an artificial model and not desirable
for real-life applications. Hur-I and Hur-II are not resistant
against a revoked-nonrevoked user collusion attack (type II),
while the rest are secure against this attack. Note that only in
our scheme does the revocation not affect the secret keys of
the existing nonrevoked users.
III. P RELIMINARIES
A. Symbols and Notations used
In this paper, we use G and GT to represent two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p, while g is a generator of G.
The symbol Zp is used to denote the group of integers modulo
p. We also make use of a randomness extractor function [17]
defined as F : GT → K, where K is the symmetric key space.
The encryption and decryption functions of the symmetric
encryption scheme are denoted as Enc and Dec, respectively.

Collusion resistant
5
5
X
X
X
X

Revocation affects others’ key
X
X
X
X
X
5

B. Bilinear Map
A bilinear map is a function e defined as e : G × G → GT ,
and must have the following properties:
1) Bilinearity: For ∀g1 , g2 ∈ G and ∀a, b ∈ Zp , the
following relationship must always hold: e g1a , g2b =
ab
e (g1 , g2 )
2) Non-degeneracy: e (g1 , g2 ) 6= 1
3) Computability: group operations in G and e should be
efficiently computable.
C. Decisional q-Parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent
Assumption
We review the definition of decisional q-BDHE assumption
from [1]. Following the notations from Sec. III-A, assume
that a, s, and q exponents (e.g., b1 , b2 , . . . , bq ) are randomly
chosen from Zp . Then, according to the decisional q-BDHE
assumption it is hard for any probabilistic polynomial time
q+1
adversary to distinguish e(g, g)a s ∈ GT from a random
r
element e(g, g) ∈ GT if the adversary is provided with
q
q+2
the vector ~v = g, g s , g a , . . . , g a , g a , g 2q , ∀1 ≤ i ≤
2q
a/bi
aq /bi
aq+2 /bi
sbi
,...,g
,g q
, . . . , g a /bi , ∀1 ≤ i, j ≤
q : g ,g
asbj /bi
a sbj /bi
q, i 6= j : g
,...,g
. The advantage  of a
probabilistic polynomial time algorithm B in solving the
decisional q-BDHE problem is defined as  ≤ |Pr[B(~v , A =
q+1
r
e(g, g)a s ) = 0] − Pr[B(~v , A = e(g, g)a ) = 0]|.
D. Access Structure
Let P = {P1 , P2 , ·, Pn } be a set of parties. A collection
A ⊆ 2P is monotone if ∀B, C : if B ∈ A and B ⊆ C,
then C ∈ A. An access structure is a collection A of nonempty subsets of P (i.e., A ⊆ 2{P1 ,P2 ,·,Pn } \{∅}). The sets
in A are called authorized sets, and sets not in A are called
unauthorized sets. In our context, the role of the parties is
defined by the attributes. Thus, the access structure A will
contain the authorized sets of attributes.
E. Linear Secret Sharing Scheme (LSSS)
Q
Let p be a large prime. Then, a secret sharing scheme
over a set of parties P is called linear (over Zp ) if
• The shares of each party form a vector over Zp .
• There exists a matrix M with l rows and n columns called
Q
the share-generating matrix for . For all i = 1, 2, . . . , l,
the ith row of M , we define a function ρ such that ρ (i)
maps row i of matrix M to an associated party. When
we consider the column vector ~v = (s, r2 , . . . , rn ), where
s ∈ Zp is the secret to be shared and r2 , . . . , rn ∈ Zp
are randomly chosen, then M
Q v is the vector of l shares
of the secret s according to . The share (M v)i belongs
to party ρ(i).
Any linear secret sharing scheme definedQ
above has the following linear reconstruction property: Let
be an LSSS for

Fig. 1: Finding minimum cover
the access structure A. Let S ∈ A be any authorized set, and
let I ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , l} be defined as I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}. Then,
there exist constants {wi ∈ Zp }i∈I such
Q that if
P{λi } are valid
shares of any secret s according to , then i∈I wi λi = s.
These constants {wi } can be found in time polynomial in the
size of the share-generating matrix M .
F. Minimum Cover
Let T be a full binary tree with m leaf nodes. Nodes in T
are labelled as yj , and each leaf node is associated with a user
labelled as u1 , u2 , . . . , um . We use path(uk ) to denote all the
nodes in the path from the root to the associated leaf node of
uk . Let the set U = {u1 , u2 , . . . , um } and RL represent the
set of all users and revoked users, respectively. Then, we can
apply subset cover to get the minimum number of tree nodes
(we call it cover(RL)) that cover U − RL (i.e., all nonrevoked
users). The algorithm to find cover(RL) is as follows:
• ∀yj ∈ RL, color all the nodes of path(yj ).
• cover(RL) is the set of all uncolored nodes that are direct
children of the colored nodes.
Figure 1 is an example of a binary tree T with 8 leaf
nodes and 8 associated users (i.e., U = {u1 , u2 , . . . , u8 }). If
RL = {y13 , y15 }, then Cover(RL) = {y2 , y12 , y14 }. Node that
six nonrevoked users (i.e., {u1 , u2 , u3 , u4 , u5 , u7 }) are covered
with just three nodes.
IV. S YSTEM A RCHITECTURE AND A DVERSARIAL MODEL
A. System architecture
A high-level system architecture of our secure data sharing
scheme has been presented in Fig. 2. Our architecture has
four main entities: the attribute authority (AA), the cloud
service provider (CSP), the data owner, and the data user.
The attribute authority is responsible for managing all the
attributes, and it creates and distributes attribute secret keys
to the users according to their authorized attribute set. It also
creates and publishes the public parameters. The CSP manages
the public cloud where the encrypted data is outsourced and
stored. Data owners encrypt their files using an attribute-based
encryption scheme and uploads the files to the public cloud
so that they are always available for the data users. Once the
data is uploaded in the cloud, the data users can download
and decrypt it anytime if they have enough attributes in their
attribute secret keys. Note that a user may have the dual role
of a data owner and a data user.

Fig. 2: System Architecture

B. Adversarial model
Security assumptions: We consider the CSP to be an
honest but curious entity that is a standard practice in revocable
ABE literature [5]–[7], [9], [18]. This implies that the CSP
properly follows the protocols of our scheme (i.e., it honestly
performs tasks like storing and updating encrypted files as per
the data owners’ request and letting the data users download
encrypted files upon request). The CSP does not tamper with
any stored information in the cloud. However, the CSP is open
to deduce any plaintext information from the stored encrypted
files and public parameters on its own. In previously proposed
revocation schemes such as [4]–[6], [9], a semi-trusted entity
(manager) needs to update users’ secret keys and ciphertext in
order to achieve revocation. This design introduces additional
security vulnerabilities, as a compromised manager can update
secret keys and ciphertext in a way that restores a revoked
user’s decryption right. Hence, user and manager collusion
is not allowed. However, we do not need any semi-trusted
manager to achieve revocation since the revocation right is
given to the data owner, who can decide whom to revoke
during encryption. We assume that the attribute authority is
a trusted entity, and it distributes attribute secret keys to users
via a secure channel such as SSL.
Adversaries and attacks: A dishonest data user is the main
adversary of our system. A dishonest data user can be either
revoked or nonrevoked. The goal of such adversaries is to decrypt a ciphertext that cannot be decrypted individually, either
because they do not have enough attributes in their attribute
secret keys or because they are revoked users (but may have
enough attributes). To achieve this goal, a dishonest data user
colludes with other dishonest data user(s) and launches type I
and type II attacks.
V. O UR P ROPOSED R EVOCABLE ABE S CHEME
There are two types of ABE schemes: ciphertext policy
attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) and key policy attributebased encryption (KP-ABE). The access polity is embedded in
the ciphertext in CP-ABE, while the access policy is embedded

in the keys in KP-ABE. We use ABE to denote CP-ABE in
the rest of the paper unless otherwise specified. In this section,
we first give the definition of our proposed revocable ABE
scheme, followed by its security model. Finally, we give the
detailed construction of our scheme.
A. Definition of our proposed revocable ABE
The revocable ABE scheme is consisted of four algorithms
defined as follows:
• (PK, MK) ←− Setup (Attmax , lmax , m): The setup algorithm takes as input the maximum number of attributes allowed
in a secret key, the maximum number of columns possible in
a LSSS matrix, and the total number of users in the system
denoted as Attmax , lmax , and m, respectively. It outputs the
public key PK, and the master secret key MK.
• CT ←− Encrypt (PK, (M, ρ), M, RL): The inputs to
the encryption algorithm are the public key PK, the LSSS
access structure (M, ρ), the message to be encrypted M, and
the revocation list RL. The algorithm outputs a ciphertext CT
so that no user in RL can decrypt CT even if the attribute set
S satisfies the access structure.
• SK ←− Keygen (PK, MK, S, uk ): The key generation
algorithm takes as input the public key PK, the master secret
key MK, the user’s authorized attribute set S, and the user’s
identifier uk . It outputs the user’s secret key SK.
• M/⊥ ←− Decrypt (PK, SK, CT): The decryption
algorithm takes as input the public key PK, the user’s secret
key SK, and the ciphertext CT. It outputs the plaintext message
M if the user does not belong to the corresponding revocation
list RL of CT and his or her authorized attribute set S satisfies
the access structure. The decryption algorithm outputs ⊥
otherwise.
B. Security model
We formalize the security model of our proposed revocable
ABE scheme by the following IND-CPA (indistinguishable
chosen plaintext attack) game.
Init. The adversary A commits to an access structure (M ∗ ,
ρ) by giving it to the challenger.
Setup. The challenger runs the Setup (Attmax , lmax , m)
algorithm to generate PK, SK, and sends PK to A.
Phase I Query. The adversary A repeatedly makes q1
private key queries for the user-authorized attribute set tuples
as in Q1 = (u1 , S1 ), Q2 = (u2 , S2 ), . . . , Qq1 = (uq1 , Sq1 ).
The challenger calls Keygen (PK, MK, Sk , uk ) for each
query Qk = (uk , Sk ), and sends the secret key SKk to A.
Challenge. A selects two equal size messages M0 , M1 , a
revocation list RL∗ , and sends them to the challenger. Additionally, A also sends to the challenger the committed access
structure (M ∗ , ρ). The challenger chooses a bit b ∈ {0, 1} by
flipping a random coin, and runs Encrypt (PK, (M ∗ , ρ), Mb ,
RL∗ ). The challenger then sends the output ciphertext CT∗
to A. The constraint is that none of the attribute sets (e.g.,
S1 , S2 , . . . , Sq1 ) in phase I query satisfy the access structure
(M ∗ , ρ).
Phase II Query. A adaptively makes private key
queries for tuples Qq1+1 = (uq1+1 , Sq1+1 ), Qq1+2 =
(uq1+2 , Sq1+2 ), . . . , Qq = (uq , Sq ) with the restriction
that none of the attribute sets in these tuples (e.g.,
Sq1+1 , Sq1+2 , . . . , Sq ) satisfy the committed access structure
(M ∗ , ρ).

Guess. A outputs a guess b0 ∈ {0, 1} for b.
The advantage of the adversary A in the above game is
defined as Adv = |Pr[b0 = b] − 1/2|. By allowing A to do
decryption queries in phase I and phase II query stage, this
security model can be easily extended to chosen-ciphertext
attack (CCA).
Definition 1: Our proposed revocable ABE scheme is secure
if all polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible
advantage in the IND-CPA game.
C. Construction of Our Proposed Revocable ABE Scheme
The detailed construction of our proposed collusionresistant revocable ABE scheme is given as follows:
• (PK, MK) ←− Setup (Attmax , lmax , m): The setup algorithm takes as input Attmax , the maximum number of attributes
any user’s secret key may have; lmax , the maximum number
of columns any LSSS matrix M may have; and m, the total
number of users. It outputs the public and the master secret
key PK and SK, respectively. The setup algorithm first chooses
a group G of prime order p with a generator g and defines a
bilinear map as e : G × G → GT . We assume that attributes
can be represented in Zp . In practice, a collision-resistant hash
function can be used to transform any string attribute into Zp .
The setup algorithm then randomly chooses a, α, β ∈ Zp . It
also utilizes a hash function defined as H : Zp → G. The hash
function is realized by choosing a polynomial L(x) ∈ Zp of
degree N = Attmax + lmax − 1 and computing h0 = H(0) =
g L(0) , h1 = H(1) = g L(1) , . . . , hN = H(N ) = g L(N ) . With
these N + 1 values, one can compute hx = H(x) = g L(x) for
any x ∈ Zp by using interpolation.
The AA then creates a full binary tree T of m
leaves and associates each user uj to a different leaf
node. For each node yi in T , AA randomly chooses
gyi ∈ G. Finally, AA publishes the public
 key as PK =
T , G, GT , e(g, g)α , g a , g β , h0 , h1 , . . . , hN and sets the master secret key as MK = (g α , β) and keeps it secret.
• CT ←− Encrypt (PK, (M, ρ), M, RL): The encrypt
algorithm takes as input the public parameters PK, LSSS
access structure (M, ρ), the plaintext message M ∈ GT , and
a revocation list RL. It outputs the ciphertext (CT). In the
LSSS access structure (M, ρ), M is an l × n matrix and ρ
is a function that associates rows of M to attributes. In this
construction, ρ is limited to be an injective function (i.e., an
attribute can be associated with at most one row of M). The
algorithm chooses a random vector ~v = (s, r2 , . . . , rn ) ∈ Znp .
These values are used to share the random encryption exponent
S. For ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l} it computes λi = ~v .Mi , where
Mi is the vector corresponding to the ith row of M . Finally,
the algorithm finds cover(RL), randomly chooses an exponent
r ∈ Zp , and computes the ciphertext as CT = (C =
M.e(g, g)αs , C 0 = g sβ , D = g r , ∀yj ∈ cover(RL) : Cyj =
gysj , ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l} : Ci = g aλi H(ρ(i))−r ). We assume
that the LSSS access structure is implicitely included in CT.
• SK ←− Keygen (PK, MK, S, uk ): The keygen algorithm
takes as input PK, MK, a set S of attributes the user is
authorized for, and the user’s identifier uk and outputs the
attribute secret key SK. Let uk ’s associated leaf node in T
be y. The algorithm finds path(y), chooses a random t ∈ Zp ,
and creates the private key as SK = (∀yj ∈ path(y) : Kyj =
1/β
g α+at gyj
, L = g t , ∀x ∈ S : Kx = H(x)t ).

• M/⊥ ←− Decrypt (PK, SK, CT): The decryption
algorithm takes as input the public paprameters PK, the user’s
attribute secret key SK for an attribute set S, and the ciphertext
CT for a LSSS access structure (M, ρ). Assume that S satisfies
the access structure and I ⊂ {1, 2, 3, . . . , l} is defined as
I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}. The algorithm finds the constants
{wi ∈ Zp }i∈I such that
P if {λi } are valid shares of a secret s
according to M, then i∈I wi λi = s. Note that these constants
{wi } can be found in polynomial time in the size of M and
there could potentially be different ways of choosing such
{wi }. The algorithm then computes the following:

D. File retrieving

The data user downloads an encrypted file CT, CT0 from
the cloud and calls Decrypt (PK, SK, CT) algorithm with
his or her attribute secret key SK. If SK has enough attributes
to satisfy the access policy of CT, the algorithm returns M as
an output. Then, the user extracts the symmetric key using the
randomness extractor function F as in K = F(M). Using
K, the data user retrieves the actual file F by running the
decryption function of the symmetric encryption scheme as in
F =Dec(K, CT0 ).
VII. S ECURITY A NALYSIS

P = e(Kyj , C 0 ) = e



g α+at gyj

1/β

, g βs



In this section, we analyze the security of our proposed
revocable ABE scheme in terms of semantic security and
collusion attacks.
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Then, the decryption algorithm retrieves the plaintext message M as in C/W = M, and outputs it. If S does not
satisfy the access structure, or the owner of SK belongs to the
revocation list RL, then the decryption algorithm outputs ⊥.
VI. A S ECURE CLOUD DATA - SHARING SCHEME BASED ON
OUR PROPOSED ABE SCHEME
In this section, we propose a secure data-sharing scheme for
the cloud based on our proposed collusion-resistant revocable
ABE scheme. We discuss the details in the following.
A. System initialization
The attribute authority (AA) runs the Setup algorithm to
initialize the system. It publishes the public key PK in the
cloud and keeps the master key MK secret.
B. Key distribution
For each user in the system, the AA runs the Keygen
algorithm and generates the attribute secret key SK for his
or her authorized attribute set S. The AA then sends SK to
the corresponding user via a secure channel.
C. File outsourcing
The data owner downloads the public parameter PK from
the cloud. It randomly chooses M ∈ GT and extracts the
symmetric key using the randomness extractor function F
as in K = F(M). Using K, the data owner encrypts the
actual file F using the symmetric encryption scheme as in CT0
=Enc(K, F). Then, the data owner includes any of the users
in the revocation list RL to revoke from the ciphertext, runs
Encrypt (PK, (M, ρ), M, RL) algorithm, and receives CT
as output. The data owner then uploads the final ciphertext
CT, CT0 as an encrypted file in the cloud.

A. Semantic security
Our IND-CPA game (in Sec. V-B) is similar to that of [1]
except in our game, each secret key query in query phase
I and II also includes a user identifier ui , and A provides
with a revocation list RL∗ in the challenge stage. It was
proven in [1] that if the decisional q-BDHE assumption holds,
then no polynomial-time adversary A can selectively win the
IND-CPA game with a challenge matrix M ∗ of size l∗ × n∗
corresponding to the access structure (M ∗ , ρ), and maximum
number of attributes per key of Attmax where n∗ + Attmax ≤ q.
Assume there exists an adversary A who has a nonnegligible advantage  = AdvA in the our IND-CPA game and
it chooses a challenge access structure (M ∗ , ρ) with the matrix
M ∗ of at most q columns. Then using the same technique
as in [1], we can build a simulator B that plays the decisional q-BDHE problem. The simulator basically programs all
the IND-CPA game parameters from the decisional q-BDHE
parameters so that the challenger cannot distinguish whether
it is playing our IND-CPA game or the decisional q-BDHE
problem. Since A has a non-negligible advantage in our INDCPA game (according to our prior assumption), A also has a
non-negligible advantage in the decisional q-BDHE problem.
However, according to the definition (of decisional q-BDHE
problem), no polynomial-time adversary has a non-negligible
advantage in solving the decisional q-BDHE problem. This
implies that A does not have a non-negligible advantage in
our IND-CPA game. So, the DEFINITION 1 holds true.
B. Collusion attack
The revocable ABE needs to be secure against both type I
and type II collusion attack. The semantic security discussed
earlier also guarantees that our scheme is secure against type
I collusion attack since the secret key queries made by the
adversary A in query phase I and phase II cannot individually
satisfy the committed access structure (M ∗ , ρ). In this section,
we formalize the security of our scheme against type II
collusion attack by the following theorem.
Theorem 1: A revoked user with enough attributes in his
or her attribute secret key cannot decrypt a ciphertext even if
the user colludes with a nonrevoked user who does not have
enough attributes in his or her attribute secret key to decrypt
the particular ciphertext.
Proof: Assume that ui , uk are two users and y, y 0 are
their associated leaf nodes in the binary tree. SK = (∀yj ∈

TABLE II: Symbols used in performance analysis and experiment
Symbol
u
a
b
s
|Gi |
|K|
|p|
Ci
P
m
r

Meaning
Total number of attributes in the system
Number of attributes in access structure A
Number of attributes in user secret key
Required minimum number of attributes to satisfy policy
Size of a single element in group Gi
Size of symmetric key
Size of a single element in Zp
Single exponentiation time in group Gi
Computation time of a pairing operation
Total number of users in the group
Total nodes in cover(RL)

1/β
path(y) : Kyj = g α+at gyj
, L = g t , ∀x ∈ S :
0
t
Kx = H(x) )) and SK = (∀yj ∈ path(y 0 ) : Ky0 j =

1/β
0
0
0
g α+at gyj
, L0 = g t , ∀x ∈ S 0 : Kx0 = H(x)t ) are their
attribute secret keys, respectively. A message M is encrypted
so that ui ∈ RL. This results in a ciphertext CT = (C =
M.e(g, g)αs , C 0 = g sβ , D = g r , ∀yj ∈ cover(RL) : Cyj =
gysj , ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l} : Ci = g aλi H(ρ(i))−r ). Note that CT
does not have any Cyj corresponding to the attribute secret
key component Kyj of ui since path(y) ∩ cover(RL) = ∅.
However, there exists a component Ky0 j in the attribute secret
key of the nonrevoked user uk that corresponds to a Cyj since
path(y 0 ) ∩ cover(RL) 6= ∅. Without the lose of generality, lets
assume that S satisfies the access structure (M, ρ) but S 0 does
not satisfy (M, ρ). This implies that ui has enough attributes
in his or her attribute secret keys to decrypt CT but uk does
not have enough attributes to do so. In order to successfully
decrypt CT, ui also needs Kyj in his or her attribute secret
keys that corresponds to Cyj . As a result, ui alone cannot
decrypt CT with SK despite having enough attributes in it.
However, ui can collude with the nonrevoked user uk to get
Ky0 j from uk ’s attribute secret key SK0 that corresponds to a
Cyj in CT. Then, ui can try to decrypt CT as follows:
P = e(Ky0 j , C 0 ) = e
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0

= e(g, g)αs+at s−ats .
It is apparent that ui cannot successfully compute W =
e(g, g)αs and hence is unable to retrieve M from C =
Me(g, g)αs . This proves THEOREM 1.
VIII. T HEORETICAL P ERFORMANCE A NALYSIS
In this section, we compare our proposed ABE scheme with
other related schemes in terms of storage, communication, and
computational efficiency from the theoretical aspect. Note that

we also include [1] (referred to as BW) in the comparison as a
baseline since our scheme is based on this. Table II illustrates
different symbols that have been used for this purpose.
A. Storage and Communication Efficiency
The space efficiency comparison in terms of ciphertext,
secret key, and public key size has been summarized in Table
III. The ciphertext size, secret key size, and public key size
represent the storage cost required by the cloud, each user, and
the attribute authority to store them, respectively. Additionally,
they represent the communication cost when these are sent
from one party to another. However, we do not consider here
the communication cost that is associated with any intermediate step during the preparation of the ciphertext, secret key,
or public key. For example, in order to achieve revocation, the
data owner sends the whole ciphertext to the manager for reencryption in UserCol [9]. As a result, the communication cost
for sending the ciphertext to the cloud would be twice as much
as what is shown in Table III for [9]. Similar intermediate steps
are necessary in [5], [6], [9] during the secret key generation
phase. Thus, the actual communication cost can be higher than
what is shown in Table III. However, there is no intermediate
step in our proposed scheme, so the cost shown in Table III
for our scheme is much closer to the real cost.
Compared to the baseline scheme [1], our scheme requires
r + 1 and logm − 1 additional group (G1 ) elements for the
ciphertext and secret key, respectively. This is because the
data owner has to create r + 1 additional group elements in
the ciphertext out of which r elements are for cover(RL). On
the other hand, the AA has to create logm − 1 additional
group elements in the user’s secret key along the path in the
binary tree. Our scheme also needs 2m − 1 additional group
elements in the public parameter compared to the baseline
scheme because a group element (G1 ) associated with every
node in the binary tree is needed in the public parameter.
Among all collusion-resistant revocable schemes (ours and
[6], [9], [10]), [9] has the biggest ciphertext because for each
attribute present in the policy of the ciphertext, r additional
group elements are needed. This results in a total of ra
additional group elements in the ciphertext. How our scheme
compares against [6], [10] in terms of ciphertext size, depends
on the value of total number of attributes in the ciphertext
(a) and the number of nodes in cover(RL) (r). If there are
few members to revoke or if revoked members are not very
sparsely distributed in the binary tree, then r will be much
smaller, and hence our scheme will have smaller ciphertext.
For bigger policies (i.e., bigger a), our ciphertext size will be
relatively smaller. In terms of the secret key size, our scheme
requires at most logm additional group elements compared
to [6], [9], [10]. However, if the attribute secret key holds a
lot of attributes, then [9] will have larger secret key size. For
example, if there are 1000 users in the group and a user has 10
attributes in his or her attribute secret key, then there will be
only 21 group elements in our secret key as opposed to 41 in
[9]. Public key size increases proportionally with the number
of total users for both our scheme and [9]. However, the total
public parameter size of [9] is larger than ours.
Compared to [4] and [5] (not resistant against type II collusion attacks), our scheme has a larger public key size, as the
public key includes an additional group element for each node
in the binary tree. While our scheme requires logm additional

TABLE III: Comparison of storage and communication efficiency with other schemes
Scheme
Hur-I [4]
Hur-II [5]
CryptCloud+ [10]
Flexible [6]
UserCol [9]
BW [1]
Ours

Ciphertext size
(2a + 1)|G1 | + |GT |
(2a + 1)|G1 | + |GT |
(2a + 5)|G1 | + |GT |
(2a + 6)|G1 | + |GT | + 2|p|
(2a + ra + 1)|G1 | + |GT |
(a + 1)|G1 | + |GT |
(a + r + 2)|G1 | + |GT |

Secret key size
(2b + 1)|G1 | + ( log m)|K|
2(b + 1)|G1
(b + 6)|G1 | + 2|p|
(b + 4)|G1 | + 2|p|
4b|G1 | + |GT |
(b + 2)|G1 |
(b + 1 + logm)|G1 |

group elements, [4] requires logm additional symmetric keys
in the secret key because it includes logm KEK keys to each
user’s secret key along the path of the associated leaf node in
the KEK key tree. However, [5] improves this by adding only
a single group element per attribute in the secret key. How [4]
and [5] compare against our scheme in terms of ciphertext size
is similar to the logic we presented earlier while comparing
our scheme with [6], [10].
B. Computation cost analysis
We show the computation cost of our scheme and compare
it with other schemes in Table IV. The computation cost
has been expressed in terms of group exponentiation and
pairing operation in a similar manner as in [4], [5], [17].
This is a reasonable consideration since these two operations
dominate relatively lightweight hash, multiplication, division,
and addition operations.
Compared to the baseline scheme [1], our scheme requires
just one additional pairing operation (in G1 ) for decryption.
For encryption, our scheme requires r +1 additional group exponentiation operations (in G1 ), out of which r is for creating
r additional group elements for cover(RL). On the other hand,
our scheme requires logm additional group exponentiation
operations (in G1 ) for the secret key generation. Among logm
additional group operations (in G1 ), logm − 1 is for creating
logm − 1 additional group elements in the user’s secret key
along the path of the associated leaf node in the binary tree.
Our key update cost is zero since we achieve revocation
without affecting the secret key of other nonrevoked users.
In contrast, all other revocation schemes require a significant
amount of computation for key updating to achieve revocation. The number of group exponentiation operation (in G1 )
required for key update is proportional to the number of users
in the system (except [4]).
In terms of decryption speed, our scheme outperforms all
the revocation scheme, thanks to only one additional pairing
operation for decryption compared to the baseline scheme [3].
We can see that [5] has the slowest decryption speed as the
required number of group exponentiation operation (in G1 ) is
proportional to the total number of users (m).
The number of group exponentiation operation (in G1 )
for our key generation algorithm increases logarithmically
with the number of users (m). However, our key generation
algorithm is still faster than that of [10]. This is because in
addition to the group exponentiation operation, CryptCloud+
also requires (2b + 7)P pairing operations, which is more
expensive than the group exponentiation operation. Our key
generation cost may even be lower than that of [4]–[6], [9] if
the number of attributes in the secret key (b) is relatively high
since logm increases very slowly.

Public key size
2|G1 | + |GT |
3|G1 | + |GT |
(u + 6)|G1 | + 3|p|
3|G1 | + 2|GT | + |p|
2(u + 3)|G1 | + 2|GT | + (2m − 1)|p|
2|G1 | + |GT |
(2m + 1)|G1 | + |GT |

Our encryption speed is much faster than that of [5], [9]
since the required number of group exponentiation operation
(in G1 ) is proportional to r and ra for [5] and [9], respectively. Among all the revocation schemes, [10] has the fastest
encryption time.
IX. E XPERIMENT
Implementation: We have implemented our scheme in
Charm [19]. It is a Python-based framework developed
for rapid prototyping of advanced cryptographic protocols.
Charm uses PBC library [20] (written in C language) for
low-level system calls including most expensive group exponentiation and pairing operations. As a result, cryptographic
protocols written in Charm performs very close to the one
written C language [21]. All hash functions were implemented
using SHA224.
A detailed parameter description for our experimental setup
is given in Table V. SS512 is a super singular EC curve
(with symmetric Type 1 pairing), and MNT224 is the Miyaji,
Nakabayashi, Takano curves (with asymmetric Type 3 pairing). In Table II, p = bit length of prime order p, k =
embedding degree, Security is the security level in bits with
respect to the discrete log problem, and the numbers associated
with the curve name represent the base field size in bits
(i.e., SS512 has a base field size of 512 bits). Though our
ReVO-ABE construction is based on a symmetric pairing
group (G × G → GT ), we have tested our implementation in
both symmetric and asymmetric group settings. Charm treats
groups as asymmetric, though the actual setting depends on
the type of underlying chosen curve. More specifically, there
are three different groups (G1 , G2 , and GT ), and pairing is
defined as e : G1 × G2 → GT . We keep most of the terms in
G1 while implementing our scheme in the asymmetric setting
since operations in G1 are generally much faster than those in
G2 .
Testbed setup: We have conducted all the experiments on a
Macbook Pro laptop with Intel® Core i7@2.2 GHz quad-core
processor and 16 GB RAM running MacOS 10.14.6. We have
used Python 3.7 and the PBC-0.5.14 library.
Results: We have mainly compared our key generation,
encryption, decryptioin, and key update running time with
CryptoCloud+ [10], Flexible [6], and UserCol [9]. We have
also reported the key generation, encryption, and decryption
running time of BW [1] scheme as a baseline comparison
since our scheme is based on the BW scheme. However, we
have not compared our experimental results with Hur I [4] and
Hur II [5] since they are not collusion resistant (against type II
attacks) and the encryption, decryption, and key update of Hur
II takes much longer than the rest. The running time of each
algorithm (key generation, encryption, decryption, and key
update) were measured in SS512 and MNT224 curves. Each

TABLE IV: Comparison with other schemes in terms of computation cost.
Key generation
2(b + 1)C1
(3b + 5)C1
(b + 13)C1 + CT + (2b + 7)P
(2b + 9)C1 + 2P
(4b + 2)C1
(b + 2)C1
(b + 2 + logm)C1

Encryption
(3a + 1)C1 + CT
(3a + 2m + 3)C1 + CT
(a + 5)C1 + CT
2(a + 3)C1 + 2CT
(3a + ra + 1)C1 + CT
(2a + 1)C1 + CT
(2a + r + 2)C1 + CT

TABLE V: Parameter details for different pairing groups
G1
512
224

G2
512
672

GT
1024
1344

p
160
224

k
2
6

time ( ms)

time ( ms)

400
300
200
100

600
400
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1,000
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600
400

200
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600
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Key update
bC1
bmC1
3mC1
(2m + b + 1)C1 + P
(2m − 1)C1
N/A
0

1,400

Security
80
100
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Curves
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MNT224

Decryption
C1 + (2s − 1)CT + (2s + 1)P
s(m + 1)C1 + (2s − 1)CT + (3s + 1)P
2C1 + sCT + (2s + 5)P
(2s + 3)CT + (2s + 4)P
(2s − 1)CT + (3s + 1)P
sCT + (2s + 1)P
sCT + 2(s + 1)P
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Fig. 4: Encryption time
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result reported here has been averaged over five individual
runs.
The running time of the key generation algorithm linearly
increases with the total number of attributes in the secret
key (b) (Fig. 3). However, our scheme also has a logarithmic
relationship with the total number of users (m). We have set
the value of m to be 1000 and measured the running time of
key generation algorithm by varying the value of b between
5 and 25. For all four curves, our running time is close to
that of BW. Even for the value of b being as little as 5, our
running time is lower than that of others. The performance
of our key generation algorithm is even better compared to
others for a higher value of b because with the higher value
of b, the number of group exponentiation operation (in G1 )
increases at a slower rate compared to others (refer to Table
IV). Interestingly, the running time of UserCol is the highest
for the SS512 curve (Fig. 3a). However, for MNT224 curve,
its running time is much faster than that of CryptCloud+
because the pairing operations take more time in MNT224
curve compared to the SS512 curve, and CryptCloud+ requires
(2b + 7) pairing operations while UserCol requires only two
pairing operations for the key generation.
The encryption running time has been shown in Fig. 4.
UserCol has the fastest running time and CryptCloud+ has
the slowest running time. The running time of encryption
algorithm mainly depends on the access structure length or
the number of attributes in the access structure (a). This is
because the number of group exponentiation operations (in
G1 ) has a linear relationship with a. However, the number of

time ( ms)

Fig. 3: Key generation time
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Fig. 5: Decryption time

group exponentiation operations of our scheme and UserCol
is also proportional to r and ar, respectively. As a result, the
running time of UserCol is significantly faster than the rest.
For our experiment, we have set the value of r to be 10 and
varied the value of a between 5 and 25.
Fig. 5 shows that the running time of the decryption algorithm has a linear relationship with the number of minimum
required attributes to satisfy the access structure (s). We have
varied the value of s from 5 to 25 at an interval of 5. Both the
number of group exponentiation (in GT ) and pairing operation
has a linear relationship with s for all schemes. The pairing
operation is much slower in MNT224 curve compared to
the SS512 curve. Consequently, the decryption running time
is higher in the MNT224 curve for all schemes. Note that

time (sec)

time (sec)
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future, we want to extend our work to support attribute-level
revocation. We have also limited the scope of this work to
static access structures only. It will be an interesting extension
if we could incorporate dynamic access policies in our scheme
in the future.
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Fig. 6: Key update time
our decryption time is very close to the baseline scheme, as
our decryption requires only one additional pairing operation
compared to that of the baseline scheme.
The revocation in our scheme does not affect the secret key
of any nonrevoked user. As a result, our revocation does not
require any key update and hence the key update cost is zero
for our scheme. However, other revocable schemes need to
update the secret keys of existing nonrevoked users. In Fig.
6, we have shown how the running time of the key update
algorithm increases with the number of users (m) by varying
the value of m from 100 to 1000. The running time of the key
update algorithm increases linearly with m for all schemes
except ours. In this comparison we exclude [1] as it does not
support revocation, and hence the key update time is irrelevant.
Note that, the performance of all the algorithms do not have
equal importance. For instance, key generation is normally a
one time task. A file may be encrypted by the owner only once
but is potentially decrypted many times by different users. If
users are revoked frequently, then key update cost can be very
critical. As a result, the performance of decryption and key
update are more important than that of other algorithms (e.g.,
key generation and encryption). From Fig. 5 and 6 we can
see that our decryption and key update algorithms outperform
other schemes.
X. C ONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper, we have proposed a revocable ABE scheme
that is resistant against both type I and type II collusion
attacks. Our scheme does not require any semi-trusted entity to
achieve revocation. Moreover, the revocation does not affect
the secret key of any non-revoked user, and hence the key
update cost for revocation is zero in our scheme. We have
also proposed a cloud-based secure data sharing scheme based
on our proposed revocable ABE. Through security analysis,
we have shown that our scheme is collusion (both type I
and type II) resistant. It is evident from both theoretical
performance analysis and experimental results that our scheme
outperforms the most relatable ABE schemes. However, in
this work we have only considered user-level revocation, but
not attribute-level revocation. More specifically, using our
proposed revocation scheme, a user (e.g., Eve) can be revoked
from a ciphertext as a whole, but not some of his or her
specific attributes (e.g., revoke only new release and movie
while keeping tv show, documentary, and scifi intact). In the
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